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Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse
Drugs: Involuntary Medication As
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
By ELIZABETH SYMONDS*
Introduction
The right of hospitalized mental patients to refuse treatment has
been recognized only relatively recently by our judicial system. Al-
though still in its embryonic state, this developing right already has
become a major issue in the field of mental patients' civil liberties.
Recognizing that the fundamental civil liberties and human dignity of
this relatively voiceless segment of the population are at stake, an in-
creasing number of courts and commentators have undertaken a re-
evaluation of mental health treatment to bring these practices into
accord with the more humanistic standards of contemporary society.
Many cases dealing with the right to refuse treatment have con-
cerned highly intrusive medical procedures which have not been
proven totally effective and which have the potential to cause grave
side effects.' In addition, several cases have centered upon the admin-
istration of certain medications without the informed consent of the
patient. For example, the use of the drugs apomorphine2 and suc-
cinycholine3 (anectine treatment) when administered without such con-
sent has been prohibited by the courts. These drugs, however, do not
represent the standard medication received by the majority of patients
in the country's mental institutions; thus, although the cases concerning
their use are landmark precedents, they do not directly protect patients
* J.D., 1980, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
I. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), a fd sub nor. Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (patient granted the right to refuse electroshock
therapy); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 461
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (same); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973) (patient granted the right to refuse
experimental psychosurgery).
2. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
3. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
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from the major drug treatment programs to which they are likely to be
subjected.
The most common pharmaceuticals used today for mental health
treatment are referred to generally as psychotropic medication, or
drugs that affect psychic functions and behavior.4 These drugs, in par-
ticular Thorazine, have radicalized the treatment of mental patients in
the last thirty years5 and are usually the primary, and often the sole,
form of treatment received by institutionalized patients. It is the often
indiscriminate and involuntary use of psychotropic drugs which is com-
ing under increasing judicial scrutiny.6
Several constitutional arguments have been raised in support of
the theory that the use of psychotropic drugs without informed consent
is illegal. Theories based upon the right to privacy,7 freedom of
speech-freedom of thought processes,' freedom of religion,9 and sub-
stantive and procedural due process' 0 have been proposed by numer-
ous commentators to support the general right to forego treatment, and
used successfully in litigation to sustain the right to refuse medica-
tion.II However, another constitutional provision-the Eighth Amend-
4. 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2601 (2d ed. A. Freedman, H.
Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1975).
5. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 769, 778 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Winick].
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (class action suit by
patients resulting in hospital staff being ordered to refrain from forcibly administering
psychotropic drugs without first obtaining the consent of the patient or his or her guardian,
unless a substantial likelihood of violence, personal injury or attempted suicide); Jamison v.
Farraby, Civ. No. 78-0445 WHO (N.D. Cal.) (pending class action against forced use of
psychotropics upon mental patients in California).
7. See, e.g., Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Pa-
tients, 23 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447, 473 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ferleger]; Wade, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: Mental Patients and the Law, 1 DET. C. L. REV. 53, 55 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Wade]; Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?"
'Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?"Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616, 661-62,
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Note]. See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976);
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
8. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Ferleger, supra note 7, at 473;
Wade, supra note 7, at 55; Note, supra note 7, at 661-62.
9. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);
Wade, supra note 7, at 62.
10. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Ferleger, supra note 7, at 476;
Note, supra note 7, at 666.
11. In two critical cases, federal district courts have upheld mental patients' rights to
refuse medication. In Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), the decision was
grounded upon both the right to privacy and due process. In a subsequent opinion, Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), the trial court issued a decree to enforce the
constitutional right to refuse medication in certain circumstances. The court required that
prior to giving mental patients psychotropic drugs in non-emergency situations, a state hos-
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ment right against cruel and unusual punishment inflicted-may be
emerging as a powerful weapon in the constitutional arsenal against
involuntary drug treatment. 12
The Eighth Amendment is most often applied in a penal context;
its use against involuntary medication has followed suit, being used to
defend prisoners' rights to refuse drugs.' 3 Yet, it also has been raised
successfully in a hospital setting to support mental patients' rights to
refuse medication.' 4 The potential impact of this Eighth Amendment
argument is almost unlimited; if recognized drug treatment, when used
without informed consent as therapy for, or control of, institutionalized
patients,15 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, medication pro-
grams affecting both voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients
in the nation's mental hospitals will be revolutionized.
Several links in this Eighth Amendment argument must be
strengthened before it becomes analytically complete. First, the physi-
ological effects of these drugs must be fully understood. Second, the
protection of the Eighth Amendment must be transferred from the set-
ting of a penal institution to a civil mental institution. To accomplish
this end, drug treatment must fall under the rubric of punishment as
defined in prior cases. Third, the circumstances surrounding the medi-
cation procedure, and its detrimental effects, must meet the standards
which the courts have set forth to determine what actions constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. To complete such an analysis, it will be
pital must obtain the patient's written consent on a form which explains the potential side
effects of the medicine and the right to refuse medication. Id. at 1307-08.
Basing its opinion on the right to privacy and the First Amendment, the court in Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), held that committed mental patients could not
be forcibly medicated except in emergency situations. See also Jamison v. Farraby, Civ. No.
78-0445 WHO (N.D. Cal.), in which a settlement was reached concerning medication prac-
tices for voluntary mental patients. Guidelines put into effect by the California Department
of Mental Health in March 1980, require that no voluntary patient receive medication in a
non-emergency situation without first giving written consent after being informed of the
possible dangers of the drug. A consenting patient who refuses to sign the consent form may
receive medication if a doctor notes the patient's consent on the form.
12. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is bind-
ing on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
13. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
14. Eg., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Welsch v. Likings, 373 F. Supp.
487 (D. Minn. 1974), aft'd, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
15. The Eighth Amendment thesis presented in this note is restricted to involuntary
medication in non-emergency situations. Adopting the Rogers v. Okin analysis, this constitu-
tional argument would apply to patients in all situations except those in which there is a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other patients, or to staff members of
the institution. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979).
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helpful to compare the intrusiveness and harmful effects of psycho-
tropic drugs with those of psychotherapeutic procedures adjudged un-
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This commentary will
discuss both of the definitional issues in an attempt to create a forceful
Eighth Amendment argument for those patients presently subjected to
unwanted medication.
I. Uses and Effects of Psychotropics
Psychotropic drugs are the most frequently prescribed class of
drugs. Approximately 250 million prescriptions for them are written
annually, totalling 25% of all prescriptions in the country. 6 These
drugs may be classified in four categories based on the condition they
are used to treat: (1) antipsychotic drugs (major tranquilizers), used to
treat schizophrenia and related psychoses; (2) antidepressant drugs; (3)
lithium, used to treat manic-depressive psychosis; and (4) antianxiety
drugs (minor tranquilizers), used to treat situational and neurotic anxi-
ety.
A. Antipsychotics
Antipsychotic drugs are used to control the symptoms of acutely
and chronically disturbed psychotic patients. 7 They were a major
breakthrough in the treatment of schizophrenia, and are now widely
considered the treatment of choice for that condition. 8 Although an-
tipsychotics do not cure schizophrenia, they do control the symptoms,
permitting patients to function outside of a hospital setting, thus reduc-
ing significantly the number of patients confined to mental hospitals.
With the use of antipsychotic drugs, delusions and hallucinations, as
well as the often disruptive, belligerent, or extremely withdrawn behav-
ior, of psychotic patients are held in remission.' 9 These agents also de-
crease agitation and hyperactivity, and ameliorate disordered thought
and perception, emotional and social withdrawal, paranoid symptoms,
and personal neglect.20 One authority maintains that with proper drug
maintenance therapy, relapse and rehospitalization can be prevented
for a substantial number of schizophrenic patients.2
16. Winick, supra note 5, at 778-79.
17. R. SAMPLE, G. DIGREGORIA & R. WICKS, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIC DRUGS: A
POCKET REFERENCE 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SAMPLE].
18. Winick, supra note 5, at 780.
19. Id. at 781.
20. AMA DEPARTMENT OF DRUGS, AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS 420 (3d ed. 1977).
21. Id. at 428. One psychiatric treatise views the advantages of antipsychotic drugs as
follows: "The discovery of the antischizophrenic effects of these drugs [chlorpromazine and
[Vol. 7:701
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Antipsychotic drugs include phenothiazines (the largest and most
commonly used class),22 butyrophenones, thioxanthenes, and rauwolfia
alkaloids.23 Most of the antipsychotics produce a family of autonomic
reactions, including blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, constipation,
paralytic ileus (non-mechanical obstruction of the bowel due to paraly-
sis of the bowel wall), urinary retention, palpitations, dizziness, faint-
ness, and inhibition of ejaculation.24 In addition, a particularly
troublesome side effect of the drugs in this group is orthostata hypoten-
reserpine] had profound effects on psychiatric practice. Although chlorpromazine did not
usually produce a permanent cure in schizophrenia, it did benefit greatly many patients in a
way no treatment had even done before. . . .The therapeutic revolution initiated by chlor-
promazine went far beyond the mere pharmacological effects of the drug. Previously, many
mental hospitals had been primarily custodial in character. The fact that clinically signifi-
cant therapeutic effects could be produced by a drug created an atmosphere that emphasized
positive treatment and led to the vigorous application of milieu therapy, psychotherapy,
group therapy, and occupational therapy. The greater use of these social therapies was
made possible by the control, through medication, of the more disruptive and destructive
aspects of the patient's illness. The fate of many patients who would otherwise have been
permanent residents of the mental hospital was profoundly altered. Some were helped so
much that they were able to remain out of the hospital and function in the community.
Other patients were discharged to nursing homes or halfway houses. For those remaining in
the mental hospital, the hospital became a more humane place. And schizophrenic patients
who become ill today can often be treated effectively by antipsychotic medication without
hospitalization."
Davis & Cole, 4ntiosychotic Drugs, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1921-22 (2d ed. A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK 1975) [hereinafter cited as Davis &
Cole].
This viewpoint is not uncommon in medical circles. When tempered by elucidation of
the harmful effects of psychotropic drugs, and perhaps by a more realistic view of the true
availability of "social therapies," the view presents a cost/benefit analysis of the use of these
medications, although the effect of the absence of informed consent is lacking. However, the
Eighth Amendment test outlined in this note does not take a cost/benefit approach; there-
fore, despite the drugs' possible advantages, their forced use and deleterious effects may still
comprise cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the possible beneficial effects of the
drugs perhaps are relevant only in a few limited aspects of an Eighth Amendment inquiry,
e.g., defining "punishment" and ascertaining whether the punishment is "unacceptable to
contemporary society." See notes 118-51 and accompanying text infra.
22. Chlorpromazine, commonly known as Thorazine, is a derivative of Phenothiazine
and was the first antipsychotic drug. It is still one of the most widely used; the number of
patients receiving this drug from 1952 to 1965 was estimated at between 50 million to 150
million. Winick, supra note 5, at 780; Note, supra note 7, at 625.
23. Winick, supra note 5, at 779-80.
24. SAMPLE, note 17, at 16-17; Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1934; Winick, supra note
5, at 782. See also THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 164 (5th ed. S. Good-
man & A. Gilman eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Goodman & Gilman].
Statistics on the incidence of side effects are included in this note where available. Side
effects which are "common" are usually so indicated. Other reactions which have been re-
ported are included, but it is not implied that all patients suffer from all of these effects.
However, all patients do risk negative drug reactions, although the extent of the risk varies
with the commonness of the side effect. In addition, the common side effects of phenothi-
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sion, a form of low blood pressure that occurs when the subject stands,
often resulting in fainting.25
Phenothiazines, and, to a lesser extent, other antipsychotic drugs,
may produce rather striking side effects on the reproductive system. 6
Amenorrhea (absence of menstruation due to other than natural
causes), false-positive pregnancy tests, increased libido, breast engorge-
ment, and lactation have been reported in women,27 while men have
been troubled by decreased libido, synecomastia (excessive develop-
ment of the male mammary glands, sometimes secreting milk), and sex-
ual impotence. 28 A variety of skin eruptions also have been associated
with phenothiazine use, and one long term effect of these drugs is a
blue-gray metallic discoloration of skin areas which have been exposed
to sunlight.2 9 In addition, 1 out of every 1,000 patients treated with
chlorpromazine contracts jaundice,3" which also has been reported with
the use of other antipsychotics. There have been reported incidents of
sudden death in individuals under treatment with phenothiazines, pri-
marily chlorpromazine, 31 although these incidents are quite rare.32
Some of these deaths have occurred in otherwise healthy, young
adults.33
The most common and dramatic side effects produced by the an-
tipsychotic drugs are the neurological syndromes manifested by the
extrapyramidal reactions, a family of central nervous system disorders
azines are directly proportional to the dose and to the period of time over which the drug is
administered. SAMPLE, supra note 17, at 16.
25. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 164; Hollister, Human Pharmacology of An-
tipsychotic andAntidepressant Drugs, 8 ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY 491, 501 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Hollister]. For a detailed account of the side effects of the antipsychotic and
antidepressant drugs, with detailed tables of drug reactions, see M. SILVERMAN, THE DRUG-
GING OF THE AMERICAS (1976) [hereinafter cited as SILVERMAN], which documents the mul-
tinational drug companies' practice of promoting their medications in Latin America by
exaggerating claims for effectiveness and not revealing their hazards. See also Crane,
Clinical Psychopharmacology in its 20th Year, 181 SCIENCE 124 (July 13, 1973), reprinted in
F. MILLER, R. DAwsON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 59 (2nd ed.
1976) (thoughtful analysis of the use of antipsychotic medication). Seegeneraly D. AVIADO,
PHARMACOLOGIC PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (1972).
26. Hollister, supra note 25, at 500.
27. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1938; Hollister, supra note 25, at 500.
28. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1938; Hollister, supra note 25, at 500.
29. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1937.
30. Id. at 1937.
31. R. SHADER & A. DIMASCIO, PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS: CLINICAL AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 156 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SHADER].
32. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1934.
33. The side effects of the phenothiazines are especially alarming, because traces of
these drugs can be found in the body as long as six months after the last dose. SHADER,
supra note 31, at 97.
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characterized by involuntary motor movement, which can be quite
stressful. 4 There are four varieties of these disorders: a parkinsonian
syndrome,35 akathesia,36 dystonia,37 and dyskinesia.3" Parkinsonian
syndrome, akathesia, and dystonia may be alleviated by lowering the
34. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1934; Winick, supra note 5, at 782.
35. The parkinsonian syndrome mimics the symptoms of Parkinson's disease: muscular
rigidity, tremor at rest, a mask-like face, salivation, motor retardation, shuffling gait, and
pill-rolling hand movements. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169; Davis & Cole,
supra note 21, at 169; Winick, supra note 5, at 782.
36. Akathesia is a feeling of motor restlessness in which the patient cannot remain still
but feels compelled to pace. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169; Davis & Cole,
supra note 21, at 1934; Winick, supra note 5, at 782.
37. Dystonia consists of bizarre muscular spasms, primarily in the head and neck, often
combined with facial grimaces, involuntary spasms of the tongue and mouth interfering with
speech and swallowing, convulsive movements of the arms and head, bizarre gaits, and diffi-
culty in walking. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169; Winick, supra note 5, at
782.
38. The dyskinesias consist of a broad range of bizarre tongue, face and neck move-
ments. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169; Winick, supra note 5, at 782. Fore-
most among the antipsychotic drug side effects is tardive dyskinesia. See Rogers v. Okin,
478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979). This syndrome, which is more common among
older persons and women, affects the part of the brain used for control and coordination of
muscle movements (the basal ganglia). See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169. See
also B. ENNIS & B. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 203 (rev. ed. 1978) [herein-
after cited as ENNIs & EMERY]. Symptoms include certain involuntary motor movements,
particularly of the face, lips and tongue, and may also involve involuntary movement of the
fingers, hands, legs and pelvic area. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass.
1979); SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 62; Kobayashi, Drug Therapy of Tardie Dyskinesig
296(5) NEw ENo. J. MED. 257 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kobayashi]; Winick, supra note 5,
at 782. The facial movements include tongue protrusion, with licking of the lips, smacking
and sucking lip movements, chewing and jaw deviations, grimacing, furrowing of the fore-
head, and eye blinking. The orofacial dyskinesias may seriously interfere with swallowing,
speaking and eating, and in some cases with breathing. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Kobayashi, supra, at 257. Other symptoms include overextension of
the spine and neck, abnormal posture, shifting of weight from one foot to another and in-
ability to stand still. See Winick, supra note 5, at 782.
Tardive dyskinesia is usually thought to develop after prolonged treatment. However,
many patients, especially the elderly, develop tardive dyskinesia after taking moderate doses
of antipsychotic drugs. See Clyne & Juhl, Tardive Dyskinesia, 33 AM. J. HOSPITAL PHAR-
MACY 481 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Clyne & Juhl]. Tardive dyskinesia may appear at
anytime during drug treatment. In addition, one of the most distinctive features of this
syndrome is the persistence of dyskinesia even after discontinuation of the antipsychotic
drug. SHADER, supra note 31, at 96; Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1936; Kobayashi, supra,
at 257. One author reported that in 5-40% of asymptomatic patients, dyskinesia developed
after discontinuation of the drug. Kobayashi, supra, at 257. Symptoms may persist indefi-
nitely after discontinuation, even after a prolonged drug-free period, although in time they
will sometimes disappear in younger patients. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at
169; Crane, Persistent Dyskinesia, 122 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 395, 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Dyskinesia]. In a large percentage of patients, however, symptoms persist months or years
after discontinuation of all psychotropics. See Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169;
Dyskinesia, supra, at 399.
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dosage of the antipsychotic drugs, taking the patient off the drug com-
pletely, or through the use of antiparkinsonian drugs. Tardive dyskine-
sia, however is frequently irreversible, and it does not respond to
treatment with antiparkinsonian drugs. In fact there is currently no
effective treatment for tardive dyskinesia.39
Extrapyramidals reaction affect a significant proportion of patients
taking antipsychotic drugs. One study of 3,775 patients treated with
phenothiazine derivatives revealed that 1,472, or 38.9% developed such
symptoms. 4° The reported incidence of tardive dyskinesia ranges from
0.5% to 60% of the patients taking these drugs.4' The high incidence of
involuntary movements in drug-treated population and the relative rar-
ity of such symptoms in similar untreated population is compelling evi-
dence that tardive dyskinesia is related to the use of phenothiazines or
similar drugs.42
B. Antidepressants
Antidepressant drugs were discovered in the late 1950's in an effort
to produce more effective antipsychotic medication.43 Two major
classes of these drugs have been developed: the monoamine oxidase
(MAO) inhibitors and the tricyclic antidepressants. The efficacy of the
39. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 169-72; Gardes & Cole, Maintenance Anti-
psychotic Therapy.- Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 32 (1976).
40. Ayd, A Survey ofDrug-InducedExtrapyramidalReactions, 175 J. AM. MED. A. 1054
(1961) reprinted in SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 62. Approximately 2.3% suffered from
dyskinesia, 15.4% from parkinsonism, and 21.2% from akathesia. Id. See also Winick,
supra note 5, at 782.
41. The trial court in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), cited two
studies which placed the rate of tardive dyskinesia among chronically hospitalized patients
at 50% and 56%, and reported another survey which showed the incidence among outpa-
tients at 41%. Winick's research revealed a rate which varied between less than 1% to 40% of
patients taking antipsychotic drugs. Winick, supra note 8, at 782. Ennis and Emery report
that 2-25% of all mental hospital patients who have been taking antipsychotic drugs undeter-
mined periods of time have tardive dyskinesia. ENNIS & EMERY, supra note 38, at 203. In
populations surveyed by 17 investigations, the tardive dyskinesia rate varied from '/ of 1% to
40%. Dyskinesia, supra note 38, at 395. One pair of authors, citing the 250 million patients
who received antipsychotic drugs prior to 1971, characterized tardive dyskinesia as a poten-
tially common disability, reported in 0.5% to 60% of the patients treated with antipsychotic
drugs. Clyne & Juhl, supra note 38, at 481. Kobayashi estimated that tardive dyskinesia
occurs in 3-6% of a mixed population of pyschiatric patients, and up to 40% of elderly,
chronically institutionalized patients. Kobayashi, supra note 38, at 257. The discrepancies
in incidence rates may be attributed to several factors including the definition of the syn-
drome, the type of patient population, the methods used in obtaining information, and par-
ticularly the clinical assessment of symptoms. Dyskinesia, supra note 38, at 395.
42. Id. at 397.
43. Winick, supra note 5, at 785.
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MAO inhibitors remains controversial,' however, and they are less
commonly used than the tricyclic antidepressants. Indeed, one author-
ity has concluded that results with the MAO inhibitors have generally
been disappointing, with few studies showing any clear-cut superiority
over placebos. 4
5
The use of antidepressants in general, and the MAO inhibitors in
particular, involves well-documented hazards.4 6 The toxic effects of the
MAO inhibitors are greater than those of any other group of psycho-
therapeutic drugs.47 The most dangerous effects involve the brain, the
liver, and the cardiovascular system; autonomic side effects include dry
mouth, orthostatic hypotension, constipation, delayed ejaculation and
impotence.4 The MAO inhibitor also may produce serious, or even
life-threatening, hypertensive crises (abnormally high blood pressure),
acute cardiac failure, and intracranial bleeding, particularly when com-
bined with certain foods such as aged cheeses and wines, and choco-
late.49 Common premonitory symptoms of such a reaction include
severe headache, stiff neck, sweating, nausea, and sharply elevated
blood pressure. Additional effects may include tremors, insomnia, diz-
ziness, vertigo headache, difficulty in urination, and skin rashes.50
Patients using MAO inhibitors may experience confusion, mild
mania, convulsion, and occasionally hallucinations; retarded depres-
sion may be transformed into an agitated or anxious one, and can occa-
sionally develop into acute schizophrenic psychosis.5 The risk is
especially high when the MAO inhibitors are used with tricyclic an-
tidepressants. Such a combination may result in tremors, fever, genera-
lized chronic convulsion, delirium, or death.5 2
The tricyclic antidepressants are substantially safer and more ef-
fective than the MAO inhibitors 3 and are the most valuable and
widely used drugs for the pharmacotherapy of depression which is bio-
chemical in origin .54 Reports on these medications reveal that the per-
centage of patients using them who show "improvement" ranges from
44. Note, supra note 7, at 625.
45. Hollister, supra note 25, at 510.
46. SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 77.
47. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 182.
48. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1947.
49. AMA DEPARTMENT OF DRUGS, AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS 360 (3d ed. 1977), re-
printed in SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 77.
50. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 182.
51. Davis & Cole, supra note 21, at 1948.
52. Id. See also SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 77.
53. SILVERMAN, supra note 25, at 76. See also SAMPLE, supra note 17, at 30.
54. SAMPLE, supra note 17, at 33.
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30% to 80%, depending on operational definitions used and dosage
schedules." However, the tricyclic drugs may produce dry mouth, pal-
pitations, tachycardia (rapid heart beat), postural hypotension, fainting,
dizziness, vomiting, constipation, edema (an excessive accumulation of
fluid in the tissue spaces), blurred vision, urinary retention, and aggra-
vation of certain types of glaucoma. 6 In addition, skin reactions often
occur early in therapy. The drugs may also cause a fine, persistent,
rapid tremor, particularly in the upper extremities, but also in the
tongue. Other side effects include excessive sweating, weakness, fa-
tigue, headache, cardiovascular problems, and endocrine changes."
C. Lithium
The use of lithium was a breakthrough in the treatment of manic-
depressives. When administered properly, it promotes behavioral and
emotional stability without requiring institutionalization. While
proper therapeutic levels rarely produce adverse side effects, tremors,
abdominal cramps, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, unusual thirst, and pol-
yuria (increased urine excretion), fatigue, and weight gain occasionally
may result.58 Muscular weakness, loss of muscular coordination, and
slurred speech also have been documented.59
If lithium is administered in excessive doses or is imperfectly elim-
inated, however, it may produce lithium toxicity. This condition has
serious consequences on the central nervous system, including confu-
sion, impairment of consciousness, and even coma.' In addition, it
may impair cardiac functioning to the point of death."'
D. Antianxiety Drugs
Antianxiety drugs have a calming effect without producing a
55. Note, supra note 7, at 625.
56. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 178; SAMPLE, supra note 17, at 33; Davis &
Cole, supra note 21, at 194.
57. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 178; Winick, supra note 5, at 786.
58. One commentator, however, asserts that the mild side effects of nausea, diarrhea,
tremor and polyuria are common during lithium therapy. Peterson, Organic Brain Syn-
dromes Associated with Drug or Poison Intoxication, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1113 (2d ed. A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 1975).
59. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 185.
60. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 24, at 185; Fieve, Lithium Therapy, in 2 COMPRE-
HENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1984 (2d ed. A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sadock
1975) [hereinafter cited as Fieve]; Winick, supra note 5, at 787.
61. Fieve, supra note 60, at 1984.
MENTAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS
marked sedative or hypnotic effect.6 2 Their efficacy for relieving symp-
toms of anxiety is accepted generally by medical practitioners.63 Even
comparatively mild antianxiety drugs, however, may produce unpleas-
ant side effects. These include drowsiness, impairment of performance
and judgment (particularly among elderly patients), vertigo, excessive
appetite, nausea, headaches, allergic and hematological disorders, im-
paired visual capability, paradoxical rage reactions, and hangover. 64
Menstrual irregularities and failure to ovulate also have been noted in
women taking these drugs. In addition, a major group of antianxiety
drugs had been associated with an increase in hostility and psychosis, 6
with sudden suicidal impulses having been reported in patients who
received a high dose of these drugs.66
The drug treatment programs commonly administered to mental
patients thus engender a wide range of potentially deleterious, on oc-
casion life-threatening, physiological and psychological side effects.
These side effects will be crucial in applying the judicial tests for cruel
and unusual punishment to the forced application of psychotropic
medications.
II. Informed Consent
It was suggested at the outset that an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to the administration of psychotropic medication may be avoided
if the drugs are given with the informed consent of the patient. This is
a major issue in most right to refuse treatment cases, and its analytic
subtleties are beyond the scope of this paper.67 It is important, how-
ever, to note that the concept of informed consent for institutionalized
62. Hollister, Drugs/or Treating.4nxiety, in DRUGS OF CHOICE 1978-1979 264 (W. Mo-
dell 1978); AMA DEPARTMENT OF DRUGS, AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS 410 (3d ed. 1977).
63. SAMPLE, supra note 19, at 21.
64. Davis & Cole, Minor Tranquilizers, Sedatives, and Hypnotics, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1966 (2d ed A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 1975) [here-
inafter cited as Tranquilizers]; Winick, supra note 5, at 788-89. Tolerance to drowsiness
usually occurs after several days, and may be combatted by reducing the dosage or discon-"
tinuing usage.
65. The major groups of minor antianxiety drugs are the benzodiazepines and the
propanediol carbamates. The former group is discussed in the accompanying text. The lat-
ter group may cause atoxia (loss of muscular coordination) and hypotension. Allergic reac-
tions also have been reported in from 0.2% to 3.4% of different series of patients, and occur
most frequently in patients with a history of dermatological or allergic conditions. Good-
man & Gilman, supra note 24, at 189, 191.
66. Id. at 191.
67. For diverse analyses of informed consent for mental patients, see ENNIS & EMERY,
supra note 38 at 135-37; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY CONSENT
HANDBOOK (1977) (discussing informed consent for the mentally retarded); LEGAL AND
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patients is fraught with controversy. Even when a patient gives written
consent to a procedure after having been informed of the attendant
risks and effects and retains the right to withdraw consent at any time,
such consent might still be tainted and inadequate for the purposes of
defending a charge of cruel and unusual punishment.
The validity of informed consent is usually based on whether the
consent is voluntary, knowledgeable and competent."S Certain legal
commentators have insisted that although a patient is civilly commit-
ted, he or she may still have the competence to give informed consent.69
One author has asserted that:
With reference to incompetency, even 'from a medical viewpoint,
there is no necessary relationship between commitability and in-
competency.' The trend in recent years among legislatures has
been toward complete separation of hospitalization and incompe-
tency; it has been recognized that their merger may needlessly
deprive persons of essential personal rights.'
There are three possible weaknesses in the "informed consent"
given by hospitalized patients. First, the effects of a treatment may not
be completely known because these drug medication procedures re-
main largely experimental.7 ' Second, as noted in Kaimowitz v. Defpart-
ment of Mental Health,72 an institutional setting may be so inherently
coercive as. to preclude truly voluntary consent by a patient.73 The
Michigan court recognized that because of the coercive environment of
the mental hospital, the physician-patient relationship is on an unequal
ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT: PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIC CON-
SIDERATIONS (D. Gallant & R. Force eds. 1978).
68. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973). See Barnhart, Pinkerton & Roth, Informed Con-
sent to Organic Behavior Control, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 39, 70-81 (1977), which persua-
sively argues for the abolition of the competency requirement in informed consent, and
against third party consent as an accepted substitute. See also Comment, Informed Consent
and the Mental Patient: California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosur-
gery and Shock Treatment, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 725, 737 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Santa Clara Comment].
69. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 472; Note, The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modo-
cation and the Involuntary Committed, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 774, 784 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Cath. U. Note].
70. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 472.
71. Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Aversion Therapy as Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 621, 625 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Duq. Note].
72. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973).
73. See Santa Clara Comment, supra note 68, at 737. See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASY-
LUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3-14
(1962).
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footing;74 a patient will often say what he or she thinks will please the
doctor irrespective of his or her true feelings.7 5 Hospital officials also
may use subtle inducements to obtain consent, further tainting its vol-
untariness.7 6 Patients who refuse treatment may be secluded, re-
strained, threatened with disciplinary action, or deprived of certain
privileges.77 One commentator's investigation of medication proce-
dures at a state mental hospital revealed the following practices:
Most of the staff acknowledges that a patient's group or grounds
privileges will be withheld while medication is being refused,
whether or not the medication is actually received by intramuscu-
lar injection. There seems, however, to be some difference in
practice among the various wards regarding the use of seclusion
in such cases. One nurse denied that seclusion is ever used when
medication is refused while an aide in another unit freely dis-
cussed with me the techniques for forced medication and subse-
quent seclusion.78
At its most insidious, the institutional atmosphere may induce a patient
to consent from the fear that a refusal will be viewed as a further indi-
cation of mental illness.79
Finally, a basic issue in informed consent is the purity of the deci-
sion-making process by which the validity of the consent, ie., whether
the consent was voluntary, informed and competent, is judged. When a
hospital staff requesting the consent also has the power to decide
whether the consent meets the standards for validity, a conflict of inter-
est may arise.8 0 Because hospital staff members initiate the decision to
administer the drug, they naturally favor its use, either for control pur-
poses or because they believe in its therapeutic qualities. In some in-
stances, use of an experimental procedure may even aid in research and
enhance the therapist's career. Staff members are not, therefore, in a
position to inform the patient objectively of all the drug's effects, nor to
make a final judgment on the adequacy of the patient's consent.81
The question of consent thus involves many difficult issues. None-
theless, it is important in bridging the first analytical hurdle of the
Eighth Amendment's applicability to involuntary drug treatment, be-
74. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PA-
TIENTS AND OTHER INMATFS 29 (1962).
75. Id. at 28-29.
76. Duq. Note, supra note 71, at 626.
77. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 469-70; Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1354 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
78. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 469.
79. Developments, supra note 77, at 1354.
80. Duq. Note, supra note 71, at 626-27.
81. Id.
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cause voluntariness, or more properly the lack of it, may transform
"treatment" into "punishment."
HI. The Eighth Amendment Right to Refuse Treatment
A. Eighth Amendment History
The history of the Eighth Amendment is especially significant in
right to refuse treatment cases, because it can elucidate the important
issue of whether the amendment's scope is limited to the criminal con-
text.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment first ap-
peared in the English Bill of Rights of 1869, and subsequently was in-
corporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.82 The
author of the American constitutional provision appeared principally
concerned with the legislative definition of crimes and punishments.8 3
Early cases such as Wilkerson v. Utah4 and In re Kemmler"5 inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment as a prohibition on extreme forms of
corporal punishment,16 enumerating as cruel and unusual such punish-
ments as beheadings, public dissection, burning at the stake, and cruci-
fixion.
The early cases defined cruel and unusual by a fixed historical
standard used at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.8 7 A
break from this inflexible criterion was made in the decision of Weems
v. United States,"8 in which the Court recognized that the proper stan-
dard should be flexible and responsive to social norms.89 Relying on
82. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Inflicted The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
83. Id. at 839-42.
84. 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).
85. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
86. See Note, Constitutional Law-The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform, 51 N.C.
L. REv. 1539, 1540 (1973).
87. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972).
88. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
89. "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experi-
ence of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the
form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions
can approach it.' The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tenden-
cies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a
constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and
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the Weems, standard, recent cases have broadened the amendment's
scope by forbidding conduct which did not reach the point of physi-
cally barbarous punishment.9"
Prior to the case of Ingraham v. Wright,9 every Supreme Court
decision based on the issue of cruel and unusual punishment concerned
criminal punishment.92 Ingraham presented an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the disciplinary corporal punishment of public school stu-
dents. The case was brought as a class action by the parents of two
pupils who were paddled by officials at a junior high school in Dade
County, Florida. The majority opinion by Justice Powell described the
causes and the effects of the incidents:
Because he was slow to respond to his teacher's instructions,
Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks with a paddle
while being held over a table in the principal's office. The pad-
dling was so severe that he suffered a hematoma requiring medi-
cal attention and keeping him out of school for 11 days. Andrews
was paddled several times for minor infractions. On two occa-
sions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full
use of his arm for a week. 93
The district court had found that the plaintiffs had not suffered punish-
ment meeting the constitutional standard of "cruel and unusual," and
were thus not deprived of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1986. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Eighth
Amendment proscription was designed to protect persons convicted of
power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this
has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against
narrow and restrictive construction. . .. [The Eighth Amendment] may be therefore pro-
gressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 373, 378.
90. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to prisoner's
serious medical needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
91. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
92. Id. at 666-67 (citing Estelie v., Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (incarceration without
medical care); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (execution for murder); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (execution for murder); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
($20 fine for public drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incarceration
as a criminal for addiction to narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation for
desertion); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (execution by electro-
cution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (15 years
imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official document); Howard v. Fleming,
191 U.S. 126 (1903) (10 years imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud); In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890) (execution by electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (execu-
tion by firing squad); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867) (fine and
imprisonment at hard labor for bootlegging)).
93. 430 U.S. at 657 (footnotes omitted).
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criminal offenses and did not apply to paddling students for purposes
of maintaining discipline in the public schools. 94 Despite the appar-
ently conclusive holding, however, other language in the opinion may
furnish a basis for extending Eighth Amendment protection to institu-
tionalized mental patients.
B. The Eighth Amendment Concept of "Punishment"
Eighth Amendment protection can only be accorded mental pa-
tients forced to take medication if such conduct is deemed "punish-
ment" within the confines of the amendment. This approach requires a
broad leap from the exclusive application of the Eighth Amendment in
the criminal arena to its extension into the civil context of the mental
institution. The Ingraham opinion presents the most recent and exten-
sive Supreme Court articulation of this complex issue. The Court in
Ingraham declared that the Eighth Amendment was "designed to pro-
tect those convicted of crimes,"9 5 implying that its application was lim-
ited to criminal punishment.9 6 However, in a significant and oft-
quoted footnote, the Court expressly reserved judgment on the poten-
tial application of the Eighth Amendment to health care practices in
mental institutions:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the
State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in
the circumstances in which they are administered to justify appli-
cation of the Eighth Amendment .... We have no occasion in
this case, for example, to consider whether or under what circum-
stances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile insti-
tutions can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment.97
This statement suggests two criteria for civil application of the
amendment: (1) there must be a "punishment," and (2) the circum-
stances surrounding the punishment must be analogous to those of a
criminal punishment.98 The following discussion will apply these stan-
dards to the involuntary medication of hospitalized psychiatric pa-
tients.
94. Id. at 664.
95. Id.
96. See Winick, supra note 5, at 806.
97. 430 U.S. at 669 n.37 (citation omitted).
98. Note, Right to Treatmentfor the Civilly Committed- A New Eighth Amendment Basis,
45 U. CHi. L. REv. 731, 741 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Note].
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C. Medical "Treatment" as Punishment
The groundbreaking case of Estelle v. Gamble99 vastly broadened
the traditional Eighth Amendment concept of "punishment." In Es-
telle the Supreme Court found that official behavior not generally con-
sidered inherently punitive was nonetheless cruel and unusual
punishment. The case was brought by an inmate of a Texas state
prison who claimed that prison officials violated his Eighth Amend-
ment rights by depriving him of adequate medical treatment. The
Court held that deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical
problems violated the Eighth Amendment, because it constituted an
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' ° Deprivation of treat-
ment, or inaction, was characterized as an infliction of pain, and thus,
as punishment.) °0
Estelle v. Gamble lends convincing support to the thesis that, in
instances of involuntary medication of mental patients, it is the treat-
ment itself which constitutespunishment, and is thus deserving of Eighth
Amendment protection.' 02 The case is significant, because the Court
found an Eighth Amendment violation in circumstances which were
not a quid pro quo for misbehavior. 03 Following this reasoning,
psychotropic drugs administered without consent for treatment or con-
trol purposes should be subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, even
though they were not dispensed to punish a patient's infraction,"° be-
cause the likelihood of pain and side effects produced by the drugs
could characterize their use as "punishment."
The distinction between treatment and punishment is particularly
blurred in the area of medical treatment administered to prisoners.
One author has vehemently argued that:
[T]he disinclination of the courts to grapple with the problems of
violence by psychiatrists against prisoners represents a blind spot,
the logical center of which is the insistence of a distinction be-
tween treatment and punishment. . . .it should not be surpris-
ing, therefore, if prison adminsitrators have from time to time
labeled as 'treatment' acts which, if called 'punishment,' would be
99. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
100. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).
101. Id. at 104-05. See Chicago Note, supra note 98, at 747.
102. See Cath. U. Note, supra note 69, at 786 (calling for application of the Eighth
Amendment to all "so-called 'treatments' inflicted upon those involuntary committed to
mental institutions").
103. Chicago Note, supra note 98, at 749-50.
104. Of course, drugs candidly administered for disciplinary purposes would fit with less
difficulty under the punishment classification.
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instantly recognized as of dubious morality or legality.105
The same commentator cites the administration of mind-altering drugs
as the most common instance of "legally sanctioned punitive vio-
lence." 10 6
A recent case involving the medical treatment of prisoners finally
refuted the distinction between treatment and punishment. In Sawyer
v. Sigler10 7 a prisoner challenged Nebraska prison officials who forced
him to take emphysema medication in crushed form, which resulted in
nausea. The district court found that this constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, not simply because of the prison officials' actions, but be-
cause of the result of such actions, i e., the nausea. 08 Thus, focusing on
the result of medical treatment rather than its form may provide a
stronger link between treatment and the "punishment" required to trig-
ger Eighth Amendment protection.
In Trop v. Dulles, °9 a case decided well before Ingraham, the
Supreme Court also propounded a standard which may distinguish
treatment from punishment. In Trop, an Army private serving in
French Morocco escaped from a stockade where he had been incarcer-
ated for an infraction. He was gone for less than a day and willingly
surrendered while heading back towards his base. He was subse-
quently deprived of his citizenship under a statute providing such a
sanction for those found guilty of desertion. The Court held that the
statute violated the Eighth Amendment, because it was penal in nature
and prescribed cruel and unusual punishment." 10 Denaturalization was
characterized as cruel and unusual punishment because it constitutes
the complete destruction of the individual's status in society, subjecting
the victim to increasing fear and distress.
The Court in Trop rejected the Government's argument that the
statute was not classified as penal and therefore constitutional limits on
105. Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45
Miss. L.J. 605, 607 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Opton].
106. Id. at 608.
107. 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970). Sawyer was a civil rights suit brought by three
state prisoners who claimed that they had received inadequate medical treatment. The dis-
trict court sustained the claim of only one of the three prisoners. In addition, it held that the
practice of denying statutory good time to prisoners unable to perform work, even when the
disability did not result from the prisoner's misconduct, violated the equal protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 698.
108. Id. at 694. See Note, Refusing Medical Care and Behavior Modcation, 10 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PRoc. 173, 184 (1976).
109. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
110. Id. at 99-102 (plurality opinion). But see Bassett v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 581 F.2d 1385, 1387 (10th Cir. 1978) (deportation is a civil proceeding
and not cruel and unusual punishment).
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the state's power to punish were inapplicable. Rather, the Court in-
sisted that "form cannot provide the answer to this inquiry. . . .The
inquiry must be directed to substance.""' The criterion used by the
Court was not whether a particular procedure is labeled treatment or
punishment, but whether by its nature it might be considered cruel and
unusual. " 2 The Court thus declared that "even a clear legislative clas-
sification of a statute as 'nonpenal' would not alter the fundamental
nature of a plainly penal statute." The court noted: "How simple
would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally
if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels posted
on them."'"13
Eighteen years later, in his dissent in Ingraham, Justice White
characterized the Trop test as a "purposive approach," which ques-
tioned whether "the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordina-
rily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation or
deterrence." 1 4
Both the Sawyer "result" criterion and the Trop "purpose" stan-
dard may be used to gather involuntary medication within the ambit of
the Eighth Amendment. The harmful side effects of many of the
psychotropic drugs, particularly the irreversible symptoms of tardive
dyskenisia, are Sawyer-like "results" upon which many courts might
look askance. In Knecht v. Gillman"5 the Eighth Circuit used the Trop
test to find that apomorphine, which induces vomiting spells lasting
from fifteen minutes to an hour, when used to punish a mental patient's
minor infraction was indeed punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. Such an analysis may be particularly useful in
cases where psychotropic drugs are given to mental patients for pu-
poses of controlling behavior or staff convenience (a widespread prac-
tice)" 6 with no therapeutic goal in mind.
Knecht was also based in part on the Eighth Circuit's reading of
Inmates of the Boys' Training School v. Ajfteck, 1 7 in which the court
111. 356 U.S. at 95 (plurality opinion).
112. Cath. U. Note, supra note 69, at 779. The Court concluded that if a statute had a
legitimate governmental purpose besides punishment, it was considered nonpenal. In stat-
utes with both a penal and nonpenal effect, the statute's controlling nature was determined
by its legislative purpose. 356 U.S. at 96.
113. 356 U.S. at 94, 95 (plurality opinion).
114. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686-87 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
115. 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973).
116. Comment, Advances in Menal Healk A Casefor the Right to Re/use Treatment, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 354, 362 (1975).
117. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). Affleck was a class action which challenged condi-
tions at a juvenile corrections institution. The trial court reviewed the inadequate feeding
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had grappled with a similar question and concluded:
The fact that juveniles are in theory not punished, but merely
confined for rehabilitative purposes, does not preclude operation
of the Eighth Amendment. The reality of confinement in Annex
B is that it is punishment. It is punishment imposed on obdurate
boys by defendant administrators of the Training School.' 8
The court in Vann v. Scott'  considered an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the practice of incarcerating runaway juveniles with seri-
ous delinquents. Like the Eighth Circuits's approach in Knecht, the
Seventh Circuit refused to be swayed by a purely semantic distinction:
Whatever the State does with the child is done is the name of
rehabilitiation. Since-the argument runs-by definition the
treatment is not "punishment," it obviously cannot be "cruel and
unusual punishment." But neither the label which a State places
on its own conduct nor even the legftimacy of its motivation, can
avoid the applicability of the Federal Constitution. We have no
doubt that well intentioned attempts to rehabilitate a child could,
in extreme circumstances, constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. 20
Under this analysis, a hospital's legitimate attempt to "rehabilitate" a
patient with psychotropic drugs could constitute punishment.
Nelson v. Heyne121 continued the erosion of the treatment-punish-
ment distinction, and presents a startlingly close analogy to forced drug
administration in mental institutions. In Nelson, juveniles in a correc-
tional institution were forced to take the psychotropic drugs Sparine
and Thorazine, "not as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program,
but for the purpose of controlling excited behavior,"' 1 a reason also
commonly advanced for the administration of psychotropic medicine
to numerous institutionalized mental patients. The court held that the
involuntary medication of the juveniles constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, citing potential harmful side effects ef the drugs similar to
those previously described: "collapse of the cardiovascular system, the
schedule, deprivation of outdoor exercise, "inhuman solitary confinement cells," id. at 1365,
and other aspects of the institution and held that the inmates' rights of due process, equal
protection, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment were violated. Id. at 1366-
67.
118. Id. at 1366.
119. 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs in Vann challenged the constitutionality of
an Illinois statute which permitted delinquency petitions to be filed against runaways. The
appellate court rejected this claim, holding that even if the state incarcerated runaways im-
properly, the delinquency provisions of the statute simply authorized an adjudication and
were distinguishable from possible subsequent unlawful treatment. -d. at 1241.
120. d. at 1240 (emphasis added).
121. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1976).
122. 491 F.2d at 356.
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closing of a patient's throat with consequent asphyxiation, a depressant
effect on the production of bone marrow, jaundice from an affected
liver, and drowsiness, hemotological disorders, sore throat and ocular
changes.""12
At least one court, however, has resolutely rejected this "treatment
as punishment" theory and refused to uphold a claim that electroshock
therapy given to an involuntarily committed patient was cruel and unu-
sual punishment. In Price v. Sheppard"'24 the Minnesota Supreme
Court distinguished the Knecht and Inmates of Boys' Training School
holdings on the grounds that in both of those cases the challenged con-
duct stemmed from a retributive goal, as it was triggered by infractions
perpetrated by the victims. The court in Price found that the elec-
troshock treatment was given purely for therapeutic reasons, with no
deterrent or retributive objectives, and not as the result of a single be-
havioral incident.'25 The court also used the Trop doctrine not to sup-
port, but to defeat the Eighth Amendment challenge, finding that
because the treatments served a legitimate purpose, the claim was inva-
lid. 12 6
Using the Sawyer "result" test, the Price analysis would not suc-
cessfully overcome an Eighth Amendment claim; electroshock therapy
may at times produce frightening and painful effects, which could re-
sult in a finding of unconstitutionality no matter how well-intentioned
the therapeutic goals. Furthermore, the Price opinion's narrow reading
of Knecht and Inmates was not mandated by the original wording of
those opinions, which might be read in a less restricted manner so as
not to preclude "non-retributive" conduct from Eighth Amendment
scrutiny. Finally, some experts would claim that electroshock therapy
does not in fact serve any legitimate purpose and may well be deleteri-
ous,' 27 in which case it would fail the purposive standard of the Trop
test.
123. Id. at 357.
124. 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976). The suit was brought by the mother of a
minor who was involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, in addition to rejecting the Eighth Amendment claim, found that the hospital
director was immune from tort liability and liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act, but
ordered that in future cases, before applying intrusive forms of treatment without the pa-
tient's consent, the state must appoint a legal guardian for the patient to represent him or her
in an adversary proceeding before a court to determine the necessity and reasonableness of
the treatment. Id. at 262-63, 239 N.W.2d 913-14.
125. Id. at 255, 239 N.W.2d at 909.
126. Id.
127. E.g., Giamartino, Electroconmuisive Therapy and the Illusion of Treatment, 35
PSYCH. REP. 1127 (1974).
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Although it found a right to refuse involuntary medication on
other grounds, the trial court in Rennie v. Klein' 28 rejected the argu-
ment that the administration of prolixin (an antipsychotic) to the plain-
tiff constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court, citing
Ingraham, did assume that the Eighth Amendment applies to persons
confined in mental hospitals. 129 However, it determined that the
prolixin was justifiably administered as treatment, not punishment.
The court based this conclusion on its findings that the hospital staff
tried to use prolixin in an overall treatment program, that psychotropic
drugs have been proven effective, and that the side effects of prolixin,
while serious, "are not unnecessarly harsh in light of the potential ben-
efits." ' 30 This cost/benefit analysis, however, is not conclusive in deter-
mining the existence of "punishment" for an Eighth Amendment
analysis. The cost/benefit considerations are not a major factor in the
"result" test under Sawyer, which focuses on the deleterious effects of
an action, and are only one possible factor in the Trop test, which de-
termines the "fundamental nature" of an act in classifying it as punish-
ment. Although potential positive effects from the antipsychotics could
be used to show the non-penal purpose of their administration as re-
quired by Trop, courts have recognized that even legitimate motiva-
tions for an action cannot deflect Eighth Amendment inquiry.' 3'
Furthermore, the court in Rennie admitted that if the patient was likely
to contract tardive dyskinesia through renewed administration of anti-
psychotic drugs, the cure would be worse than the illness, 32 thus dilut-
ing the court's cost/benefit ratio for Eighth Amendment purposes.
D. The Hospital Setting: An Analogy to Criminal Confinement
In addition to an initial finding of a "punishment," the Ingraham
Court required that the circumstances surrounding the punishment be
analogous to those of a criminal punishment in order to trigger Eighth
Amendment protection. The Ingraham opinion describes two charac-
teristics of penal confinement which serve as the rationale for such a
constitutional requirement. The first, and perhaps more important, 33
characteristic is the prisoner's involuntary confinement. Indeed, the
Court based its opinion in large part on the openness of the school,
which provided its students public recourse, as opposed to the closed
128. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (1978).
129. Id. at 1143.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1972).
132. 462 F. Supp. at 1146.
133. Chicago Note, supra note 98, at 741.
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community of a jail in which the outside world could not interfere nor
serve as advocate. 134 The Court relied heavily on the fact that the pub-
lic schools are open to public scrutiny, and that students are in less
need of Eighth Amendment protection than are prisoners.1
3 5
Mental institutions, however, are in many ways as closed to
outside society as are prisons, which the Ingraham Court acknowl-
edged were in such need of constitutional oversight. Just as a prisoner's
incarceration "deprives him of the freedom to be with family and
friends and 'to form the other enduring attachments of normal
I")136life, so confinement in a mental institution often cuts off a patient
from most contact with society. Mental patients, like prisoners, are to-
tally dependent on the state for food, shelter, medical treatment and
other necessities of life. Both mental patients and prisoners are in posi-
tions of utter helplessness vis-a-vis the state, with no means of prevent-
ing or rectifying abuse or of receiving outside assistance. 13 7 This
condition is aggravated because public scrutiny of mental hospitals is
minimal at best. Whereas the Court in Ingraham denied Eighth
Amendment protection to students because they were not physically
confined to school grounds, mental patients are often physically con-
fined and isolated from outside allies who might support them. Even
voluntary patients may find that they are not always free to leave the
hospital at will.
In effect, the loss of liberty, separation from friends and family,
and dependence on state officials for the satisfaction of basic needs puts
civilly committed patients in a vulnerable position, remarkably analo-
gous to that of prisoners. 138 In addition, the duration of commitment to
a mental institution may be as long or longer than a prison sentence, 139
the physical environment may resemble that of a prison, and the coer-
cive power of the state in controlling patients' behavior parallels the
conditions in many prisons."
134. 430 U.S. at 669-70.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
137. Chicago Note, .rupra note 98, at 741.
138. Id. at 741-42.
139. In the landmark case of Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), a pa-
tient's right to treatment as the concomitant compensation for the loss of his or her liberty
was first enunciated. In the course of his opinion Judge Bazelon, a noted judicial authority
on mental health and the law, had this to say about the indefinite length of a patient's
residency: "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not punishment ...
Absent treatment, the hospital is 'transform[ed]. . . into a penitentiary where one could be
held indefinitely for no convicted offense..." Id. at 452-53 (footnote omitted).
140. Wade, supra note 7, at 64.
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The second characteristic which identifies an action as punishment
is stigmatization. This burden rests heavily on almost all mental pa-
tients, as society continues to treat them with amusement, scorn, or
fear.' 4 1 For example, the stigma attached to a mentally ill criminal de-
fendant may be even more severe than that imposed on other
criminals. 41 In addition, a mental patient's stigmatization may include
not only social but legal disabilities, such as restrictions on voting
rights, jury service, driving and gun licenses. Finally, a prior commit-
ment may be a crucial factor in a subsequent commitment proceed-
ing.'
43
In holding that proof of mental illness and dangerousness in invol-
untary civil commitment proceedings must be beyond a reasonable
doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Ballay'" concluded after a
thoughtful analysis that civil commitment was analogous to incarcera-
tion and that mental patients deserved the safeguard of the strict stan-
dard of proof accorded to prisoners. The court's emphasis on the
involuntary confinement and stigmatization of mental patients was a
precursor of the Ingraham opinion, which intimated that these traits,
because they were characteristic of criminal incarceration, could gener-
ate Eighth Amendment claims if present in other circumstances. The
Ballay opinion declared:
As we have highlighted throughout, the loss of liberty-the inter-
est of 'transcending value'-is obviously as great for those civilly
committed as for the criminal or juvenile delinquent. Indeed, it
may be greater in the former since the statute provides for indefi-
nite commitment. The only question is whether the 'stigma' asso-
ciated with involuntary civil commitment is as severe as the
stigma of finding that an individual committed a crime. Even
accepting recent medical advances, current studies clearly indi-
cate the fallacy of contending that most people view mental ill-
ness as a disease similar to any physical ailment of the body. At
best, an enlightened minority has been persuaded to accept this
view. 145
Several courts have summarily applied the Eighth Amendment to
patients in state hospitals without resorting to a tortured analysis. For
141. See generally B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIA-
TRISTS AND THE LAW 145-78 (1972); Sarbin & Maninso, Failure a/Moral Enterprise: Atd-
tudes of the Public Towards Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULT. & CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970).
142. Winick, supra note 5, at 807. See also Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils
of the "Criminal-Insane," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 258, 260-63 (1974).
143. Chicago Note, supra note 98, at 743.
144. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
145. Id. at 668 (footnotes omitted).
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example, Wheeler v. Glass,'4 6 involved a class action by two mentally
retarded youths institutionalized in a state hospital. As punishment for
an alleged homosexual act, they were bound to their beds in a spread-
eagle position for seventy-seven and one-half hours in a public area of
the hospital, and several times forced to scrub walls for ten consecutive
hours dressed in short, backless hospital gowns. The court decried such
sanctions, labeling them cruel and unusual punishment because they
were uncommon and did not meet evolving standards of decency in a
human society. 47 Similarly, in United States v. Solomon,"' a suit to
enjoin certain practices of state mental health officials that allegedly
violated the constitutional rights of mentally retarded inmates in a state
hospital, the Fourth Circuit declared that "it is too late in the day to
deny that in a proper case the protections of the Eighth, Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments extend to the mentally retarded who are in-
voluntarily confined."' 149
An Eighth Amendment challenge was also upheld in Harper v.
Cserr.150 In Harper, a voluntary mental patient had hanged herself
after numerous suicide attempts. Her husband sued, claiming that the
supervisor of the mental institution's failure to prevent the suicide con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court agreed that the
amendment could apply to voluntary patients who, because of their
disabilities, are largely helpless and who may be confined defacto, de-
pending on their disabilities and access to relatives, friends, guardians
and other resources.15 ' The court seemed to assume that there was lit-
tle question the Eighth Amendment would apply to involuntary patients
because an "involuntary mental patient has no alternative to enduring
whatever conditions the state provides; if his captors allow him to be
beaten or consign him to inhuman conditions, it seems rational to
speak. . . of. . . an invasion of civil rights by his captors."'' 52
146. 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
147. Id. at 987.
148. 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977). The claims were based on violations of the Eighth,
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was never decided on the merits, how-
ever, as the complaint was dismissed on the ground that the Attorney General had no right
to bring the suit.
149. Id. at 1124. Accord, Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1972):
"There is no doubt that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment is not restricted to instances of particular punishment inflicted on a given individual
but also applies to mere confinement to an institution which is 'characterized by conditions
and practices so bad as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people'."
150. 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 1123.
152. Id.
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The thesis that involuntary medication may be cruel and unusual
punishment should apply to both voluntary and involuntary patients.
Superficially an involuntary patient's situation. may be more analogous
to that of a prisoner, and thus more likely to fulfill the Ingraham re-
quirements described above. But a stong argument has been made
which demonstrates that patients with "voluntary" status are actually
often in institutions against their will.'53 In addition, even truly volun-
tary patients are often, like prisoners, isolated from outside advocates,
and are as subject to the intrusiveness and harmful effects of psycho-
tropics as are their involuntarily committed counterparts.
One recent case has applied the line of reasoning presented above,
which distinguishes the openness of the Ingraham school setting, with
its concomitant safeguards, from the closed, insulated mental institu-
tion. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital154 was a class
action suit brought by residents and former residents of an institution
for the retarded. The trial court opinion documented the shocking
quality of patient treatment and conditions at the hospital. These in-
cluded a hazardous and filthy physical environment, abusive use of
physical restraints, and inappropriate use of psychotropics. The court
found that drugs were often used for control rather than treatment, and
that the rate of use in some units was extremely high. Drug effects were
inadequately monitored, and in only 29% of the cases in which drugs
were administered were the effects on the resident evaluated. After re-
viewing evidence of some of the harmful effects of psychotropics, such
as hypersensitivity to sunlight, ataxia (inability to maintain balance
and gait) and gingival hyperplasia (gum tissue condition marked by
inflammation, bleeding and increased growth), the court concluded
that the use of psychotropics "actually impedes the habilitation of the
resident, especially when used as a control rather than a habilitation
device." 155
In response to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim, the Halderman
defendants argued that Ingraham limited the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment to those convicted of crimes. The court rejected
this reasoning, citing the Ingraham footnote which reserved the ques-
tion of Eighth Amendment applicability to inmates of mental institu-
tions, and insisting that retarded patients do not have the safeguards
guaranteed the Ingraham plaintiffs' children who were victims of cor-
153. See ENIs & EMERY, supra note 38, at 90-95.
154. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
155. Id. at 1308.
[Vol. 7-701
poral punishment at school.' 5 6 The court cited the patients' own handi-
caps, which might prevent them from making effective complaints, and
the institution's isolation and segregation from the community as rea-
sons for applying the Eighth Amendment.'57 Few if any of the physi-
cally abusive incidents triggering the claim were committed as
disciplinary measures, 158 yet, unlike Price, the court seemed to find this
of little consequence, perhaps because, unlike the electroshock treat-
ment in Price, the incidents were blatantly anti-therapeutic.
In sum, the circumstances surrounding an institutionalized mental
patient's forced drug treatment may well trigger a claim or cruel and
unusual punishment. The administration of drugs is no longer insu-
lated from an Eighth Amendment challenge simply because it is la-
beled as treatment and not punishment because the
treatment/punishment distinction is becoming less arbitrary. Further
reason for applying the Eighth Amendment to mental patients is found
in the many similarities between institutionalization and criminal con-
finement. The way is thus cleared to activate the constitutional protec-
tion to which the Supreme Court alluded in its Ingraham footnote on
involuntary mental patients.
E. Judicial Standards for Determining Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
and Their Application to Involuntary Medication
The words of the Eighth Amendment are not precise, and their
scope is not static.' 59 The concept "is not fastened to the obsolete, but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu-
mane justice."' 60 The Supreme Court has recognized that "the Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."''
This notion of flexibilty is especially pertinent when creating stan-
dards for the use of psychotropic drugs. Because they were so recently
developed, the extent and severity of their effects still are not com-
pletely documented. Judicial decisions concerning the constitutionality
of their application must therefore be dependent in part upon the con-
tinuing evolution of medical knowledge. In addition, society's attitudes
towards mental illness and its treatment are continually changing.
156. Id. at 1320-21.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1321.
159. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
160. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
161. 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion).
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What was once an accepted medical procedure for such patients may
now be regarded under contemporary standards of humanism as scan-
dalous or barbaric. For example, performance of lobotomies, once
condoned by some medical professionals, is a practice which has since
fallen into disfavor. For twenty years, beginning in the late 1930s,
frontal lobotomies were considered an important and advanced tech-
nique in treating extremely disturbed mental patient; between 1940 and
1960 approxmately 50,000 were performed in the United States. How-
ever, the operation often caused patients to become asocial, apathetic
and intellectually dulled. Of the operations monitored during one
study, 3.6% resulted in the patient's death, and 51.5% caused undesir-
able side effects such as partial paralysis, bladder control problems, and
convulsions. With the appearance of the phenothiazines, the practice
of lobotomies fell into disuse. 162 It is possible, therefore, that further
medical research coupled with continuing humanistic concern for
mental patients might alter the "evolving standards of decency" and
render the use of psychotropics unconstitutional.
Although the criteria for determining cruel and unusual punish-
ment remain flexible, judicial decisions have created three separate
tests to discern Eighth Amendment violations. The first test is whether
the punishment in question is "of such character as to shock the general
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness."'' 63 As articu-
lated by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles: "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards."'"
This "fundamental fairness" test has been the most frequently
used, perhaps because it was derived from the earliest decisions con-
cerning the scope of the Eighth Amendment. 6 1 It was further refined
by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,166 which held that imposi-
tion of the death penalty under certain circumstances constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. Justice Brennan in his Furman concurrence
declared that "a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading
162. Santa Clara Comment, supra note 68, at 736.
163. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965).
164. 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion).
165. See Note, Recent Applications ofthe Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishments: Judi-
cially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal Institutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1125 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hastings Note].
166. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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to the dignity of human beings."' 167 He acknowledged that severe
mental pain as well as physical suffering, could trigger a violation. 68 It
is in this context that one commentator's remarks appear particularly
appropriate: "Perhaps the most ubiquitous form of violent punish-
ment-as-therapy in prisons is accomplished with tranquilizing drugs.
To immobilize a person against his will with drugs is violence for the
same reasons that chaining a person to the wall with shackles is vio-
lence." 16 9
The negative effects of psychotropic medicines can erode the basic
core of human dignity that the mental patient must try to preserve.
The nausea, Parkinson syndrome, akathesia, dystonia and dyskinesia
associated with the use of these drugs attack the fundamental well-be-
ing of the patient, producing a degradation which rob the patient of his
or her physical integrity. Arguing that electroshock and psychosurgery
are prohibited by the Furman tests, one author declared that "their re-
sult may be degrading. Certainly turning one into a human vegetable
demeans one's dignity."' 170 A sensitive observer in the wards of many
state mental hospitals in which psychotropics are the major and often
the only form of "treatment" might agree that this description is also at
times applicable to the results of involuntary drug therapy.
Civilized standards of decency also may be viewed in light of the
extreme mental and physical intrusiveness of psychotropic drugs. Pa-
tients who refuse to take drugs orally are occasionally given medicine
intramuscularly, constituting a serious intrusion upon the body of the
patient.' 7 ' Similarly, few punishments are more intrusive upon the pa-
tient's mind, for the patient is totally vulnerable to the mood changes
that the medicine creates, and is usually incapable of resisting them. A
Knecht medical witness's characterization of apomorphine, which pro-
duces severe vomiting spells, may perhaps by analogy apply to many of
the effects of the antipsychotics: "its [apomorhine] use is really punish-
ment worse than a controlled beating since the one administering the
drug can't control it after it is administered."' 72 The standard of "fun-
damental fairness" articulated in this Eighth Amendment test appears
to preclude these drastic, intrusive measures upon an unconsenting pa-
tient.
167. Id. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Opton, supra note 105, at 639.
170. Wade, supra note 7, at 65-66.
171. Note, Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under "Emergency Re-
straint Statutes," 11 NEw ENG. L. REv. 509, 528-29 (1976).
172. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Justice Brennan's Furman opinion also stated a second principle
inherent in the examination of whether a punishment respects human
dignity: "the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment." '73
Thousands of mental patients, however, are automatically given
Thorazine and other psychotropics with little concern as to the true
appropriateness of the prescription for the individual patient. Indeed,
for many years the phenothiazines have been used in public mental
hospitals on a very large scale to control patients and keep them quiet
and docile. 174 This rationale of administrative convenience leads to the
arbitrary use of medication for many patients, in violation of Justice
Brennan's charge.
Justice Brennan's refinement of this first test also included the
principle that a severe punishment "must not be unacceptable to con-
temporary society. . . . Rejection by society, of course, is a strong in-
dication that a severe punishment does not comport with human
dignity."' 75 One of the most precise indications of public policy on a
given issue is found through an examination of statutory requirements.
Although drug treatment does not as yet share the more extensive stat-
utory protection accorded electroshock treatments and psychosurgery,
recent statutes are beginning to ban the practice of administering medi-
cation without informed consent at least in certain situations. For ex-
ample, seven states have statutes barring unnecessary or excessive
medication.'76 The efficacy of such statutes depends, of course, on the
definition of "unnecessary or excessive." South Carolina and Michigan
statutes provide even stronger safeguards against involuntary medica-
tion. The South Carolina law implies that drugs may be used for re-
straint only if the doctor indicates that it is required for the patient's
medical needs.'77 In Michigan, prior to a commitment adjudication, a
patient cannot be given chemotherapy without his or her consent, un-
less it is necessary to prevent physical injury to the patient or others.1 78
173. 408 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added).
174. Opton, supra note 105, at 640.
175. 408 U.S. at 277.
176. See Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Aental Patients' Right to Re/use Treat-
ment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461 (1978) (containing a complete survey of state statutes on the
right to refuse treatment). Plotkin cautions, however, that statutory protection actually of-
fers patients little real protection from coerced treatment. Id. at 498. For an additional
state-by-state survey of right to refuse medication statutes, see 2 MENTAL DISABILrrY L.
REP. 240 (1977).
177. S.C. CODE § 44-23-1020 (1977).
178. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1718 (1975) states: "(1) Chemotherapy shall not be
administered to an individual who has been hospitalized by medical certification or by peti-
tion pursuant to chapter 4 or 5 [civil commitment sections] until after the preliminary court
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These legislative judgments that such forced treatment is inappropriate
is a strong indication that society no longer tolerates such pharmaceuti-
cal punishment. Court decisions from many jurisdictions upholding
Eighth Amendment challenges to certain medical procedures are also a
harbinger of a change in societal attitudes.
The second Eighth Amendment test is that a punishment is cruel
and unusual if greatly disproportionate to the offense for which it is
imposed. I79 This standard generally is measured by the severity of the
crime for which a prisoner is punished. The court weighs the social
and administrative harm caused by the prisoner's conduct against the
emotional and physical damage caused the inmate by the particular
method of punishment.8 0 By analogy, the test can be used to balance
the mental patient's "antisocial behavior"-the conduct which has
caused the patient to be committed-with the effects of the psycho-
tropics. Until recently, patients could be involuntarily committed
under a parenspatriae rationale in which the patient might possibly
have committed no offense whatsoever against society. Although a po-
lice power rationale is becoming more popular, it often hinges on a
diagnosis of a patient's future dangerousness, a judgment which is
questionable at best. The commitment determination also may be
founded on the presence of suicidal tendencies, a psychological prob-
lem which should not be considered a societal offense. Similarly, past
or present dangerousness has been offered as a rationale for forced
drug treatment. In those cases, a "least restrictive alternative test" and
a narrow, workable definition of dangerousness offer a measure of pro-
tection to the patient's constitutional rights.
The above discussion suggests that the painful, frightening, and
often irreversible effects of psychotropic drugs which many mental pa-
tients must endure are greatly disproportionate to the relative harmful-
hearing has been held unless. . . the administration of such chemotherapy is necessary to
prevent physical injury to the individual or others.
(2) Chemotherapy shall not be administered to an individual who has been hospitalized by
medical certification or by petition pursuant to chapter 4 or 5 on the day preceding and on
the day of his full court hearing unless the individual consents to such chemotherapy or
unless the administration of such chemotherapy is necessary to prevent physical injury to the
individual or others." In addition, a recent study of the California Assembly has recom-
mended that the right to refuse medication be included in right to refuse treatment legisla-
tion. D. CHANDLER & A. SALLYCHILD, CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF
RESEARCH No. 31, THE USE AND MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS IN CALIFORNIA'S
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS (1977).
179. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910).
180. Hastings Note, supra note 165, at 1126-27.
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ness of the behavior underlying their commitment. In one case
challenging the forced administration of prolixin and Thorazine, for
example, the court recognized that "if the patient is likely to contract
tardive dyskinesia through renewed administration of antipsychotic
drugs, the cure would be worse than the illness, and involuntary medi-
cation would not be permitted."'' Thus, the enormity of the conse-
quences of involuntary psychotropic treatment, when constrasted with
what is often nothing more than administrative convenience may be
expected to persuade an increasing number of courts that patterns of
medication cannot continue to be immune from judicial scrutiny.
The third, final, and perhaps least frequently used, 1 2 test is the
concept that a punishment may be considered cruel and unusual when,
although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, it goes beyond
what is necessary to achieve that aim, that is, when a punishment is
unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose for which it is used.' 83 As
stated by Justice Brennan in Furman:
A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unneces-
sary: The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot
comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the
pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less se-
vere punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the
punishment is inflicted the punishment inflicted is unnecessary
and therefore excessive. 184
In many instances involuntary drug treatment might fail to satisfy
this standard. Medication often is used to treat and control patients on
a widespread basis because it is less expensive and takes much less staff
assistance than would psychotherapy.' Indeed, many state mental
patients see a psychiatrist with startling infrequency. However, psycho-
therapy is a much less dangerous and intrusive procedure than psycho-
tropics and could in some cases achieve the purposes for which drug
therapy is ostensibly administered, ie., patient rehabilitation. More
stringent control of dosages could also be used to partially fulfill this
"least restrictive alternative" standard. 8 6
181. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146 (D.N.J. 1978).
182. Hastings Note, supra note 165, at 1127.
183. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
184. 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
185. See note 116 supra. See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
446 F. Supp. 1295, 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (physical and chemical restraints, ie., psychotropic
drugs, used as control measures in lieu of adequate staffing); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp.
487 (D. Minn. 1974), af'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1977) (insufficient staffing the rationale for excessive use of tranquilizers for behavior con-
trol).
186. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d
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I These three tests for determining cruel and unusual punishment
are used by some courts in the alternative, by others in combination.
18 7
The above discussion has demonstrated that in many instances the use
of medication without the informed consent of the patient fails to con-
form to the requirements of these standards, thereby providing the
grounds for an Eighth Amendment challege to such forced treatment.
F. Judicial Precedents of Eighth Amendment Claims Against
Involuntary Medication
Courts have recently been willing to prohibit the use of certain
involuntary drug treatments on the basis of the Eighth Amendment.
Perhaps the most well known cases in this area are Knecht v. Gillman1'
8
and Mackey v. Procunier.89 In Knecht, mental institution inmates
brought suit to enjoin the use of apomorphine. The drug had been
used by the hospital staff as an integral part of an "aversion therapy"
program based on principles of behavior modification and it was ad-
ministered to patients who misbehaved as a means of changing their
"undesirable behavior patterns." Patient violations leading to the aver-
sion therapy were reported either by staff members or other inmates.
Neither a nurse nor a doctor personally witnessed the violation. Appli-
cable infractions included the giving of cigarettes against orders, failure
to get up, talking, swearing and lying. For such misconduct, a nurse
would administer apomorphine by intramuscular injection, without a
doctor present. The apomorphine injection induced vomiting which
lasted from fifteen minutes to an hour, and also produced a temporary
cardiovascular effect. It is unclear whether the patients always gave
initial consent to the procedure, but in any event, they were not permit-
ted to withdraw consent once given.
In its ruling in Knecht, the Eighth Circuit, insisting "the mere
characterization of an act as 'treatment' does not insulate it from
Eighth Amendment scrutiny," 90 found that the institution's use of apo-
morphine on nonconsenting patients was cruel and unusual punish-
ment. It ordered the trial court to enjoin the administration of the drug
on the institution's inmates unless the patients gave written consent and
were adjudged informed and competent enough to do so by a physi-
cian. The court also declared that the consent must be reversible at any
657, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Note, Voluntarily Confed MentalRetardates: The Right to Treat-
ment vx. The Right to Protection from Harm, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 787 (1974).
187. Hastings Note, supra note 165, at 1125.
188. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
189. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
190. 488 F.2d at 1139.
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time, and that each injection must be individually authorized by a doc-
tor and based on a violation observed by a professional staff member,
not simply a fellow inmate.
The Ninth Circuit in cMackey v. Procunier91 reversed a district
court dismissal of a suit brought by a state prisoner at the California
Medical Facility at Vacaville who had been administered suc-
cinycholine (also known as anectine) without his consent. As in
Knecht, the drug was used as part of a program of aversion therapy.
Succinycholine is not recommended for administration to conscious
patients because of its terrifying effects which have earned it its label of
"fright drug"; when administered it causes breathing to stop. 192 The
court held that if the plaintiffs proved their allegations, serious consti-
tutional questions would be raised, including violation of the right to
privacy, caused by impermissible tinkering with the mental processes,
and use of cruel and unusual punishment. 193
Knecht and Mackey do not specifically involve the psychotropic
drugs whch are main focus of the discussion herein. Nevertheless they
are of important precedential value because they can serve as initial
standards for determining specific Eighth Amendment criteria in invol-
untary medication cases. Of particular importance is a comparison be-
tween the detrimental side effects of the drugs in question. The Knecht
court found that continuous vomiting induced by apomorphine consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment. It is quite conceivable, however,
that the harmful effects of the antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs
described above are equally as dangerous and unpleasant, even when
the drugs are properly administered and monitored. Thus, by anal-
ogy, their administration without patient consent could also entail an
Eighth Amendment violation. In fact, one writer sees a direct parallel
between the Knecht case and the use of antidepressants with respect to
the unknown aspects of the drugs and the psychologically debilitating
effect of such medication.194 This writer also contends that "although
the effects of anectine may be greater than those accompanying
Thorazine, or antidepressants, the degree of intrusiveness upon the
mind of the patient seems quite similar."' l95
The comparison between Knecht and Mackey on the one hand,
191. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
192. Id. at 877.
193. Id. at 878.
194. See Note, Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under "Emergency
Restraint Statutes," 11 NEw. ENG. L. REV. 509, 528-29 (1976).
195. Id. at 529.
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and the involuntary use of psychotropics on the other, is especially
compelling once the treatment/punishment distinction has been re-
moved.196 Indeed, the irreversible effects of tardive dyskinesia present
an especially strong case in favor of Eighth Amendment protection
against antipsychotics when viewed in light of the Knecht and Mackey
decisions. The other extrapyramidal symptoms and the questionable
effects of the antidepressants also should not be discounted in analyz-
ing an Eighth Amendment claim against such treatment.
Several courts have specifically addressed Eighth Amendment
challenges to these widely used psychotropic drugs. Not surprisingly,
many of these successful claims have arisen in a penal context. A class
action on behalf of children institutionalized in a state training school
successfully challenged the institution's practice of punitively adminis-
tering tranquilizers in Pena v. New York State Divison for Youth. 197
Thorazine and other tranquilizing drugs were used by the institution's
staff to control "excited behavior" of the boys. Boys were also kept in
isolation for over twenty-four hours without permission from appropri-
ate authorities, bound with physical restraints connecting their hands
and feet behind their backs, and left lying on their stomachs on the
floor. These practices all violated New York regulations, yet the dis-
trict court found most shocking the violations of the regulations per-
taining to drug administration.' Holding that the particular
conditions under which it was administered violated the Eighth
Amendment, the court enjoined the use of Thorazine at the institution
as a punitive device, but authorized its use as part of an ongoing treat-
ment program supervised by a doctor. The court also insisted the boys
have the option of taking the drug orally, which lessened its physical
and psychological dangers.
In Souder v. McG'uire'99 the forcible use of psychotropic drugs on
an inmate at a state hospital for the criminally insane was held suffi-
cient to maintain an action under the Civil Rights Act. The Souder
court declared that "involuntary administration of drugs which have a
painful or frightening effect can amount to cruel and unusual punish-
ment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment."'2 °"
Nelson v. Heyne2°0 concerned the use of Thorazine and Sparine to
196. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
197. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
198. Id. at 210.
199. 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
200. Id. at 832.
201. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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control excited behavior in juveniles at a correctional institution. The
court held that the intramuscular administration of the drugs to
juveniles by correctional institution staff without first attempting less
drastic means of control and without adequate medical guidance or
prescription violated the Eighth Amendment. Admittedly the circum-
stances in Nelson involved the improper administration of drugs,
whereas the thesis at issue herein also centers on drugs administered
according to medical standards. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of
the use of these drugs as punishment in Nelson is significant.
In addition to its findings on medication, the Nelson court held
certain corporal punishment to be in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In the portion of its opinion discussing corporal punishment, the
court made some observations that are also applicable to drug treat-
ment. It noted that corporal beatings are "easily subject to abuse in the
hands of the sadistic and unscrupulous, and control of the punishment
is inadequate."2 2 The identical observation may be made about the
administration of psychotropics to the thousands of isolated mental pa-
tients committed in institutions which rarely come under public scru-
tiny and which hardly ever have patient advocates.
Two cases have explicitly found that forced medication in a non-
penal hospital setting constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In
Welsch v. Likins" 3 the court found that the excessive use of tranquiliz-
ing medication as a means of controlling the behavior of mentally re-
tarded inmates and not for therapeutic purposes might infringe on their
Eighth Amendment rights. This could be an important precedent for
many patients who are drugged more for purposes of administrative
convenience and control than for truly therapeutic reasons. The second
case, Scott v. Plante,2" involved the administration of Thorazine, Com-
202. 491 F.2d at 356.
203. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), affd inpart, vacated and remanded in part, 550
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977). The suit was a class action under the Civil Rights Act brought by
mentally retarded inmates of Minnesota mental hospitals. The district court upheld the con-
cept of a constitutional and statutory right to treatment and of patients' right to the least
restrictive appropriate treatment. Id. at 502. It also found that several specific practices at
the institution (including the use of medication) as well as the overall conditions there might
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 503.
204. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976). The suit was brought by a long time resident of a
psychiatric hospital who had been charged with murder but had the charges against him
dismissed on grounds of insanity. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims of unconsti-
tutional involuntary medication, confinement without right to treatment, unhealthy physical
conditions, unconstitutional confinement, procedural inadequacies during inmate hearings,
and the plaintiff's request for counsel. The Third Circuit reversed the lower court on each of
these issues and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 950.
Constitutional challenges to forced drug treatment of prisoners or juveniles in correc-
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pazine, Mellaril, Visprin and Trilafron. In Scott the court held that
under certain circumstances the inmate of a mental institution sub-
jected to such medication could raise an Eighth Amendment claim.
Conclusion
The right to refuse medication is an essential civil liberty for the
thousands of institutionalized mental patients who are obliged, often
on a daily basis, to take psychotropic drugs. These drugs are highly
intrusive and often cause serious and sometimes irreversible side ef-
fects. The Eighth Amendment's prohibiton against cruel and unusual
punishment should provide a safeguard against the forced use of such
medication even in cases in which it is used for therapeutic purposes
and administered in a "medically acceptable" manner.
Although usually applied in a penal context, the Eighth Amend-
ment may extend to a patient's right to refuse such treatment. This
theory is supported by the current judicial trend which halts the arbi-
trary distinction between "treatment" and "punishment." Courts are
increasingly disinclined to stand idly by after being exposed to stories
of systematic suffering needlessly inflicted upon captive mental pa-
tients. Relying on Estelle v. Gamble2" 5 and the Ingraham footnote,2 °"
the courts are treating as punishment official conduct which may not be
inherently punitive, but whose effect is the functional equivalent of re-
tributive sanctions. When disinterested malevolence is justified as "ad-
ministrative convenience," judges are increasingly prone to apply and
Eighth Amendment analysis. As judicial understanding of mental ill-
ness expands, courts view the promiscuous use of psychotropics as an
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
Eighth Amendment protection may also be triggered when forced
druggings of mental patients occurs under circumstances analogous to
those of criminal confinement. The reality of confinement is easily in-
terpreted as punishment. Patients are forgotten while institutionalized
and shunned upon release. The totality of their helplessness and the
tional institutions have not, however, been uniformly successful. Veals v. Ciccone, 281 F.
Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1968), was one such failure. Veals was a prisoner in a federal peni-
tentiary who sought a writ of habeas corpus to halt the prison staffs administration of medi-
cation to him despite his protests. His claim sanctioned by approved medical authority was
rejected, in large part because the court found his treatment sanctioned by approved medical
authority. See also Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (court rejected claim
that Thorazine involuntarily administered to patient by injection constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment).
205. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
206. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977).
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indefiniteness of their confinement should serve to heighten judicial
sensitivity.
Many psychotropics cause painful and dangerous side effects; thus,
in essence, their use without informed consent constitutes punishment.
The negative consequences and their highly intrusive nature are so in-
tolerable that they meet the standards enumerated by the courts as a
requisite to sustain a charge of cruel and unusual punishment. The
involuntary use of these medications can destroy a patient's self-respect
in contravention of the Eighth Amendment mandate of due regard for
human dignity. In fact, such use of psychotropics may prove degrading
to human dignity in the truest sense, transforming healthy human be-
ings into physically disabled individuals.
The administration of these dangerous and unpredictable drugs
arbitrarily inflicts severe punishment on thousands of mental patients.
Various statutes and the burgeoning number of hostile court decisions
indicate that involuntary drugging is incompatible with the humanistic
standards of contemporary society. Its results are greatly dispropor-
tionate to the harmfulness of the behavior for which a patients is com-
mitted and are often unrelated to the professed goal of rehabilitation.
Finally, the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs violates
the Eighth Amendment because it is unnecessarily cruel, as less harm-
ful alternative treatments could replace psychotropics.
Recent decisions have upheld Eighth Amendment challenges to
involuntary drugging in both penal and non-penal institutional set-
tings. Future litigation can expand such efforts and take advantage of
the broad protective potential of the ban against cruel and unusual
punishment in order to ensure committed mental patients the right to
refuse medication. The amendment can serve as an important instru-
ment for patients and advocates of mental patients' rights working to
restore to such patients the choice of avoiding the inescapable effects of
psychotropic drugs. Such a choice is a basic civil liberty and funda-
mental concept of human integrity that must no longer be denied.
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